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be only to the date of compliance with Kentucky Revised
Statutes section 882.450 (1953). In order to defeat a prior
equity the purchaser at the execution sale must be a bona fide
purchaser.
3. If competing creditors have delivered executions to different
officers, the first levy prevails, but if to the same officer, the first
delivery creates a lien on the debtor's property.
Carl W. Turner
EVIDENCE-THE VANISHING PRESUMPTION
Jane's husband has been absent and unheard of for seven years.
Jane, as beneficiary of a life insurance policy on his life, seeks to obtain
its proceeds by suing the reluctant insurance company. At the trial,
upon proof of the basic facts of absence for seven years without cause
or suspicious circumstances, there arises a universally recognized
presumption that the husband is dead. The insurance company intro-
duces evidence from the lips of a witness, who says he saw the husband
last year in Timbuktu. At this point we have a presumption which has
been challenged by contradictory evidence. What happens to this re-
buttal presumption is the topic of this paper. According to one writer,
there are three answers expressed by the courts in answer to the above
question: (1) The Thayer-Wigmore theory, to the effect that the
presumption vanishes upon the introduction of evidence to the con-
trary and unless the party relying on the presumption then goes for-
ward with evidence to support the fact presumed, a verdict will be
directed in favor of the opposing party.1 The sole effect of the pre-
sumption, under this view, is to place on the other party the duty of
going forward with the evidence. (2) The Presumption-as-Evidence
theory, that the evidence supporting the presumption, the presumption
itself, and contrary evidence, if any, are submitted to the jury. Under
this view the presumption is weighed as evidence in deciding the fact
in issue.2 (8) The Conditional Submission to the Jury theory, that it is
for the jury to determine the truth and veracity of the evidence con-
tradicting the presumption. Under this view if the jury believes the
contrary evidence then it must find for the party against whom the
presumption would have operated. But if the jury disbelieves the
contrary evidence, then the presumption is controlling and the jury
must find accordingly. Under this view the presumption does not
I McBaine, Presumptions; Are They Evidence?, 26 Cal. L. Rev. 519, at 532
(1938).
2 d. at 532-533.
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disappear nor is it considered evidence, but is submitted to the jury
as controlling if the evidence contradicting the presumption is dis-
believed.8
The Thayer-Wigmore Rule
This theory is followed by a large majority of the courts,4 including
the Supreme Court of the United States.' It was started on the road to
general acceptance by the compilation of Thayer's A Preliminary Trea-
tise on Evidence at the Common Law in 1898. It wasn't until Professor
Wigmore took up the banner, however, that the rule started steam-
rolling toward its present majority.6 The rule these writers espoused
was simple and logical-the real effect of a presumption of law is
merely to invoke a rule of law compelling the jury to reach a certain
conclusion in the absence of evidence to the contrary. If the opponent
does offer evidence sufficient to "pass the judge," the presumption as a
rule of law disappears, and the case is given to the jury free from any
rule.7 Most authorities adopting this view would still submit the issue
to the jury, from which they may infer the fact presumed from the
proven facts upon which the presumption rested, but they would do
so without the benefit of the presumption.8
At a glance, if this theory were given a strict application, it would
seem too harsh. It seems to invite perjury on the part of the person
who wishes to overthrow the presumption since the mere introduction
of contrary testimony or writings in evidence seems to destroy the
presumption and subjects the party depending upon it to nonsuit or a
directed verdict. Most presumptions have a strong footing in prob-
ability. This means that the basic facts which bring forth the pre-
sumption not only give the proponent the benefit of a prima facie
case, required or permitted, but are also, by themselves, strong cir-
cumstantial evidence raising a logical inference that the presumed fact
exists.9 In such a case the conflict between the circumstantial infer-
ence, which remains even if the presumption disappears, and the con-
tradictory evidence calls for a determination by the jury. But what
about presumptions which have no basic fact and are based on prob-
3Id. at 533.
4 For cases see 9 Wigmore, Evidence, 290 n. 6 (1940, Supp. 1955). See also
to the effect that presumptions are not evidence, 158 A.L.R. 747, 748 (1945).
5 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Gamer, 803 U.S. 161 (1938).
6 Wigmore first dealt with the problem in his A Treatise on the System of
Evidence In Trials at Common Law (1904).
7 9 Wigmore, supra, note 4.,
8 Id. at 291.
9 McCormick, Evidence 650 (1954).
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ability alone? Here the presumption ordinarily disappears without
even an inference remaining. Is this shocking? In this type of situa-
tion, if the facts from which the presumption arose are not strong
enough to support a circumstantial inference, why shouldn't the op-
posing party be relieved of his burden of rebuttal without the strong
proof that is required to offset the presumption having a strong in-
ference drawn from its basic fact. Even here the rebutting evidence
may be so weak that enough of an inference will remain from the com-
mon experience of all mankind to send the question to the jury. In
one such case involving the question of whether a death was a suicide,
the court said:
The presumption of law is against suicide, as contrary to the general
conduct of manldnd, and where the evidence of evidence is circum-
stantial only, and admits of more than one reasonable conclusion, the
question is for the jury. . . .10
This is believed to be in accord with the Thayer-Wigmore theory,
although there are some writers, advocating another view, that seem
to think otherwise." The principal objection of Thayer and Wigmore
to allowing presumptions, as such, to exist after the interjection of
evidence to the contrary is that it gives the presumption a weight
that it does not and should not possess, because they feel that the
essential function of a presumption is to fix the duty of going forward
with the evidence, and no more.
12
II
The Presumption-as-Evidence Rule
A second view of the problem is that "a presumption is evidence
and may in certain cases outweigh positive evidence adduced against
it."' 3 The presumption under this theory disappears only when the
facts upon which it is based have been overcome by evidence to the
contrary.14 This view is followed only in a few jurisdictions. 15 Under
10 American Benev. Ass'n. v. Stough, 26 Ky. 1093, 1095, 88 SW 126, 128
(1904). See also Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Bush, 236 Ky. 400, at 404, 33 SW
2d 351, at 353 (1930).
11 McBaine, supra note 1 and Morgan, Instructing The Jury Upon Presump-
tions And Burden of Proof, 47 Harv. L. Rev. 59, 82 (1933), where the author
says: "If a policy is strong enough to call a presumption into existence, it is hard
to imagine it so weak as to be satisfied by the bare recital of words on the witness
stand or the reception in evidence of a writing."
129 Wigmore, supra note 4 at 290; Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evi-
dence at the Common Law 336, 384 (1898).
13 Smellie v. Southern Pac. Co., 212 Cal. 540, 299 P 529, at 532 (1931).
14 W Vyckoff v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 173 Ore. 592, 147 P 2d 227, at
230 (1940).
15For cases see Anno. 158 A.L.R. 747, 750 (1945).
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this rule, instead of a presumption merely fixing the burden of going
forward with evidence, it practically shifts the burden of proof. The
one relying on the presumption had the original burden of proof, but
upon the introduction of the presumption, he is being placed in a posi-
tion where, although he still has the burden of persuasion, what he
now asserts is considered to be a fact.16 This places too great a burden
on the opposing party, since, practically, it makes it improbable that
he can overthrow the presumption. This does more than create a prima
facie case, it creates evidence in the proponent's favor. A presump-
tion is a legal rule or a legal conclusion and is not evidence."7 As the
Missouri court said, "presumptions are the bats of the law, which the
light of evidence frightens and causes to fly away."18
This quotation is an oversimplification, but it expresses the general
view that a presumption is definitely not to be considered as evidence.
Even in jurisdictions adopting this second view the courts seem to find
it distasteful. For example, the Oregon court in a four to three de-
cision, followed this view only because of long-established precedent
over a strong dissent by Justice Brand who, citing extensive authorities,
felt that the Thayer-Wigmore theory should be adopted.19
III
The Conditional Submission To The Jury Theory
Under this view the presumption is submitted to the jury as con-
trolling if the jury disbelieve the rebutting evidence. Professor
Morgan's argument for this theory is:
If a policy is strong enough to call a presumption into existence, it is
hard to imagine it so weak as to be satisfied by the bare recital of
words on the witness stand or the reception in evidence of a writing.20
This third view is followed by some courts who feel that presump-
tions should have more weight than under the Thayer-W¥igmore
theory, but not so much as to be considered as evidence. Some of the
courts which follow this rule go too far. For instance the court said:
The cases are clear upon the proposition that the nonexistence of the
presumed fact must be conclusively established before presumption
can be eliminated. 2'
16 McBaine, supra, note 1 at 547.
17 Thayer, supra, note 12 at 576.
18 Brunswick v. Standard Accident Ins. Co. of N.Y., 278 Mo. 154, 213 SW
45, 50, 7 A.L.R. 1213 (1919).
39 Wyckoff v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., supra, note 14 at 234 (dissent).
20 Morgan, supra, note 11 at 82.
2 1 Beggs v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 219 Iowa 24, 257 NW 445, 447
(1934).
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This goes further than most courts which are considered to follow
this view.22 This court commits the same error as those giving the
presumption probative value; it gives a presumption greater weight
than it logically should possess. The better interpretation of the third
view is stated in a leading case thusly:
From this it would follow that if the plaintiff offered no evidence
upon the issue and the trier disbelieved the testimony offered by the
defendant... then plaintiff would be entitled to recover ... .23
Among the several reasons given as to why most rebuttal presump-
tions should not disappear upon the appearance of evidence contrary
to the fact presumed, the following are most often argued: 24 (1) The
objectives of the presumptions could be defeated by testimony that
would not be believed by the jury or by the judge sitting as trier of
the facts; (2) The witness might be corrupt, untrustworthy or his
powers of observation might be poor; or (3) The witness could block
desirable objectives because he might be prejudiced or willing to com-
mit perjury. The general feeling surrounding this theory, that more
weight should be given presumptions, is not without merit. But to let
the duration of the presumption depend on belief or disbelief of spe-
cific facts in evidence is impractical, to say the least. How, without
utterly confusing the jury, could you accomplish such a result? Should
you present each bit of evidence, as it is introduced, to the jury for its
determination of belief or disbelief or should you wait until the time
for instructions and include all the contrary evidence on a belief or
disbelief basis in your instruction as to whether the presumption fails
or is in force. It is believed that it would be too difficult a task to
frame instructions which would make the life of the presumption de-
pend on belief or disbelief of specific items of evidence.
A slight variation of this view, advocated by Professor Morgan,
would continue the presumption until the evidence puts the minds
of the jury in equilibrium as to the existence of the presumed fact.25
He concludes that there would be no difficulty in making a jury under-
stand that the presumption that a fact does exist prevails until the
party against whom it operates convinces them that it is as probable
that the fact presumed does not exist.26 Professor Morgan seems to
presuppose that under the Thayer-Wigmore theory, the mere introduc-
22 O'Dea v. Amodeo, 118 Conn. 58, 170 A 486 (1934); Gillett v. Michigan
United Traction Co., 205 Mich. 410, 171 NW 536 (1919); Kunk v. Hocking
Valley Ry. Co., 74 Ohio St. 125, 77 NE 752 (1906).
-3 O'Dea v. Amodeo, supra, note 22 at 466-489.
24 McBaine, supra, note 1 at 534.
25 Morgan, supra, note 11 at 80.
26 Id. at 81.
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tion of any flimsy evidence will cause the presumption to disappear
and the depending party will lose. This is fallacious, since underlying
most presumptions there are basic facts which do not disappear and
the jury would be at liberty under the Thayer-Wigmore doctrine to
consider the inference arising therefrom, the only difference being,
that the inference is not accorded the artificial weight of presumption.2T
As has already been said, if the presumption rests on no basic fact,
then it is weak and should disappear upon introduction of evidence to
the contrary. With this latter type we can say that the fact presumed
can no longer be thought of as probably true.28 There is another reason
why Professor Morgan's theory is also unsound because it obviously
overestimates the ability of the average jury. Should not instructions
be simplified rather than made even more confusing and technical?
Even a jury of trained lawyers would have a difficult time determining
when the evidence is in exact equilibrium.
IV
Kentucky Cases
The Kentucky Court is typical in its use of unfortunate and mis-
leading language, when declaring the law of a particular presumption.
It is generally accepted that a presumption's function is to shift the
burden of going forward with evidence, not to shift the burden of
proof. 29 But the Kentucky Court as late as 1953 said:
While there may be a presumption against suicide, that presumption
has no force other than to shift the burden of proof. . . .30
It is submitted that the Kentucky Court probably did not mean that
the burden of proof is shifted because, in this decision, it quoted from
Aetna Life Ins. v. Tooley, in which the Court said:
The presumption against suicide is overcome, where the preponder-
ance of the evidence is consistent with the theory of suicide, and is
at the same time inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of death
by accident or by the act of another.31
This shows nothing more than carelessness in choice of words. We
are confronted with the same problem when we try, from studying the
cases, to discover where Kentucky stands on the "Vanishing Presump-
tion." It would seem from the cases that the Court is merely fitting
27 9 Wigmore, supra, note 4 at 290.28 McBaine, supra, note 1 at 534, n. 37.
29 Thayer, supra, note 12 at 337, 575; Wigmore, supra, note 4 at 285.
3 0 Thelen v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 261 S.W. 2d 427, at 428 (Ky.
1953).
3116 F 2d 243, 244 (1926).
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language to a preconceived decision. Let us look at some of this lan-
guage and the presumption involved. In a case involving the presump-
tion of marriage by reputation, the Court said:
A presumption may be indulged only so long as there is
no substantial evidence to the contrary. When that is offered, the
presumption disappears, and the issue must be decided on the evi-
dence.32
In this case there was "substantial evidence" and so the Court said it
"disappears." In another case involving the presumption against suicide
the Court said, "But where the evidence is such that the jury may or
may not infer suicide, it is the duty of the Court to submit the issue to
the jury for its finding."33 These two cases are consistent with each
other and are consistent with the majority view that the presumption
disappears when met with substantial contradictory evidence.34 The
same can be said for the Kentucky cases involving the presumption of
sanity.35 These three presumptions represent the group which lack a
basic fact from which a valid inference could be drawn, and could not
operate without the particular rule of law which created them. Lack-
ing a basic fact, they are of a weaker variety and their disappearance
does not disturb the court on appeal. But it is a different story when
the court is confronted with a strong presumption, for instance, legiti-
macy of children born in wedlock. The presumption in favor of
legitimacy contains two factors: (1) the basic fact of marriage; plus
(2) strong public policy against bastardizing children. The courts
seem to require a great deal more to expel a presumption such as this
than one based on probability alone. In one such case involving
legitimacy the court said that this presumption would give way "only
when it comes in conflict with clear, distinct and convincing proof."36
It would seem that we, at this point have two different rules for two
different types of presumptions. Now let us look at another common
type of presumption which, although having a basic fact, lacks the
strong public policy.
In Kentucky, there is a statutory presumption which reads as
follows:
If any person who has resided in this state goes from and does not
return to this state for seven successive years, he shall be presumed
to be dead, in any case wherein his death comes in question, unless
proof is made that he was alive within that time.
37
32 Carroll v. Carroll, 251 SW 989, at 991 (Ky. 1952).
33 Ky. Home Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Watts, 298 Ky. 471, at 475, 183 SW 2d
499, at 501 (1944). 34 Supra, note 4.
35 City of Covington v. O'Meara, 133 Ky. 762, 119 SW 187 (1909); Daven-
port v. Jenkins Committee, 214 Ky. 716, 283 SW 1044 (1926).
3 0 Dudley's Adm'r. v. Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Md., 240 SW 2d 76, at 79
(Ky. 1951).37 Ky. Rev. Stat. see. 422.130 (1953).
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It has been held that this statute does not abolish the common law
presumption, which is applied if, for some reason, the statutory rule
cannot.38 The presumption of death after seven years' absence has
been overcome in Kentucky by the testimony of three disinterested
witnesses, who testified they saw the party within the prescribed
seven year period.39 Evidence that the missing party's aunt was told
by an acquaintance that she saw or thought she saw the party, was
held insufficient in another case which seemed to require positive
evidence before the presumption would disappear.
40
A discussion of the law in Kentucky on presumptions would not be
complete without some mention of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
One of the most interesting and extraordinary applications of this rule
in Kentucky, occurred in the case of Lewis v. Wolk.41 A brief resum6
of the facts of this case are in order to fully appreciate the impact of
this case. The plaintiff was injured when the defendant's car rolled
down an incline after being parked in an up-hill position. The trial
court directed a verdict for the defendant when the defendant and
another testified that the wheels were turned into the curb and the
brake was set when the car was parked. Since the plaintiff was com-
pletely dependent upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur he seemed to
be lost upon the introduction of such evidence to the contrary. But
the Court of Appeals came to his rescue, reversing and sending the
case back for retrial with the requirement that the defendant show
how the accident could have happened without his negligence. The
appellate court said:
Presumption or inference of negligence is not destroyed by de-
fendant's evidence tending to show the contrary.
42
In another part the same court said:
Certainly the jury is authorized to balance the accepted probability
against the defendant's denial. 4
3
It would seem from what was said in this case that in order for the
defendant to unshackle himself from the burden of the presumption,
he must show how the accident could have occurred without his negli-
gence. This is as close as we come in Kentucky to a shifting of the
38 Bechtold v. Klefken, 300 Ky. 797, 190 SW 2d 479 (1945); Hill's Adm'x.
Metro. Life Ins. Co., 240 Ky. 172, 41 SW 2d 935 (1931).
39 Columbia Life Ins. Co. v. Perry's Adm'x., 252 Ky. 793, 68 SW 2d 393
(1934).4 0 Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Edelen's E'x., 308 Ky. 455, 214 SW 2d 769
(1948).
41812 Ky. 536, 228 SW 2d 432, 16 A.L.R. 2d 974 (1950).
42 Id. at 541, 228 SW 2d, at 435.
43 Id. at 542, 228 SW 2d at 435.
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burden of proof arising from a presumption. In explanation of the
case the court in Geller v. Geller said:
The rule does not raise a conclusive presumption, but it does require
the defendant to explain the occurrence if he would avoid liability.44
Does the court intend to literally shift the burden of proof in these
negligence cases where the res ipsa loquitur doctrine applies? Prob-
ably not, it is merely saying that under these facts the defendant must
be more convincing in his rebutting proof. In still a later case, the
court seemed to take a more reasonable view of the rule in the Wolk
case; in drawing an analogy the court said:
The mere spoken word of the plaintiff as to the cause of the collision
is scarcely enough to demolish the reasonable inference of negligence.
Such fallible testimony of itself is not conclusive. Its acceptance as
sufficient to exonerate the defendant would make it an easy matter to
avoid the consequences of neglect. The defendant's testimony was so
regarded in Lewis v. Wolk. .. .45
Even when the above case is considered, it would seem that in Ken-
tucky there is a strong presumption of negligence when the facts call
for application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. The reason for this
must lie in some sort of feeling on the part of the court that a plaintiff
who can bring himself within the doctrine, is entitled to more aid than
one who is able to produce positive evidence of negligence. That is,
in the former case the defendant is in the much better position to
explain how the accident occurred than the plaintiff is, whereas in
the latter it is just the opposite. It is submitted that the doctrine res
ipsa loquitur, though technically a presumption of law, is, in addition,
a rule of evidence and should be considered a separate class of pre-
sumption from the usual presumptions of law and therefore the re-
quirement set out in Lewis v. Wolk should not be repugnant to the
majority view that presumptions should disappear upon the introduc-
tion of evidence to the contrary. The result achieved here could be
explained by giving sufficient weight to the basic facts alone to take
the case to the jury.
In summing up the law in Kentucky, the only thing that can be
given as a guide is that one has to look at the presumption upon which
he stakes his claim and act accordingly. If it is one which is based on
probability alone, which disappears easily, he had better work a little
harder to find something upon which to base his claim or, the chances
are, he will fail. If he has a "basic fact" presumption he is in a little
44 Celler v. Geller, 314 Ky. 291, at 295, 234 SW 2d 974, at 977 (1950); see
also 37 Ky. L. J. 327 (1949).
45 Crawford v. Alexander, 259 SW 2d 476, at 478 (Ky. 1953).
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better position, and if he has the basic fact plus a strong public policy
he is in an even better position. The Kentucky Court seems to require
more and stronger evidence to dispel the presumption as you ascend
the scale from probability to public policy.
Conclusion
In conclusion, it is believed that Kentucky follows the majority
Thayer-Wigmore theory which is the best solution to the problem of
presumptions. Its antagonists seem afraid that unscrupulous or dis-
honest witnesses could cause a genuine claim to be lost. They seem to
state the majority rule in this way, "The presumption disappears upon
the introduction of any evidence to the contrary." It is submitted that
their interpretation is wrong, and if so it defeats their whole argument
against the majority view. The correct way to state the rule is, A
presumption serves the purpose of making a prima facie case, and it
continues to serve this purpose until the adversary has gone forward
with his evidence. How much evidence is required to meet or over-
come the presumption is determined not by a fixed rule, but according
to the strength and value of presumption. Very little proof may be
required in the case of a presumption which lacks a basic fact from
which a valid inference can be drawn, or it may require a great deal
where the presumption has a basic fact plus a strong public policy.
As for the fear of perjury, the same problem exists any time a case
goes to trial. If the safeguards are adequate for the ordinary case why
should not they also be in the case of presumptions? A strong reason for
acceptance of the majority rule is its simplicity. The submission of a
presumption to the jury for their decision on whether it disappears
places too great a burden on the normal jury. It is submitted that the
jury could not and probably would not even try to understand such
instructions. The Thayer-Wigmore theory avoids this difficulty and is,
therefore, the better view. Earl M. Henry
GARNISHMENT IN KENTUCKY-SOME DEFECTS*
The purpose of this article is to summarize and clarify the present-
day garnishment procedure in Kentucky for the benefit of the begin-
ning practitioner and to suggest reforms to those who may question
the adequacy of the present system.
* Much of the information contained in this note was obtained from con-
versations with practicing attorneys. The writer is particularly indebted to Rufus
Lisle, Esq., of Lexington, and to Robert Caldwell, Esq., of Ashland, whose letter
to the writer is quoted at some length in this note.
